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Abstract
This article seeks to understand to a greater 
extent why and how governments are involved 
in voluntary environmental programs (VEPs). A 
better understanding of the role(s) of government 
in VEPs is of relevance because the current VEP 
literature considers such involvement one of the 
key conditions that may explain VEP performance. 
Building on the existing VEP literature, the article 
maps, describes and contrasts the roles of 
governments in 40 VEPs in the building sector 
in Australia, the Netherlands, Singapore and 
the United States. It finds that governments 
are involved in almost all of these VEPs (95 per 
cent) and that governments predominantly take 
up traditional roles (i.e. initiating and leading 
VEPs and monitoring and enforcing VEPs), 
sometimes combined with innovative roles 
(i.e. supporting VEPs, or assembling VEPs). 
This, the article argues, leaves opportunities 
for other modes of involvement unexplored, 
particularly those in which governments 
take up only innovative roles in VEPs.
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What roles are there for government in voluntary environmental 
programs? 
Jeroen Van der Heijden, Regulatory Institutions Network, Australian National 
University 
Introduction 
Policymakers, practitioners and scholars alike have become increasingly interested in innovative 
approaches to environmental governance (for recent discussions in this journal, see among others 
Jordan & Lenschow, 2010; Klassert & Möckel, 2013; Steurer, 2011; Taylor, Pollard, Rocks, & Angus, 
2012). Such innovations show a shift away from traditional prescriptive ‘command and control’ type 
environmental regulation towards governance tools that encourage self-organisation, market 
solutions, or both (Gunningham, Kagan, & Thornton, 2003; Wurzel, Zito, & Jordan, 2013). They also 
fit with a shift away from sole state authority towards the involvement of non-state stakeholders in 
environmental governance (e.g., Ansell & Gash, 2008; Trubek & Trubek, 2007).  
Voluntary environmental programs (VEPs) are a typical example of innovative environmental 
governance tools. Individuals and organisations participating in VEPs pledge to change their 
behaviour in such a way as to create desired societal outcomes beyond what is required by state-led 
regulation. In return for this they receive exclusive rewards, such as the branding of their goods and 
services, or the ability to showcase industry leadership (deLeon & Rivera, 2010; Morgenstern & Pizer, 
2007; Potoski & Prakash, 2009). 
VEPs are considered a hopeful alternative to state-led environmental regulation. It is expected that 
the clear rewards for participants make them willing to participate in VEPs and comply with a VEP’s 
requirements (see various discussions in Croci, 2005; Mol, Volkmar, & Liefferink, 2000; Potoski & 
Prakash, 2009). However, whether VEPs indeed live up to these expectations is a topic of much 
debate. Whilst some studies point towards successful VEP performance in terms of improved 
environmental behaviour on the part of VEP participants or an overall contribution to desired collective 
ends (Cashore, Auld, & Newsom, 2004; Morgenstern & Pizer, 2007), other studies find no or at best 
limited VEP performance in such terms (deLeon & Rivera, 2010; Ronit, 2012). These empirical 
studies highlight that various contextual and design conditions affect VEP outcomes and scholars 
have repeatedly stressed that a better understanding of these conditions is key for future VEP 
assessments (Prakash & Potoski, 2012; Van der Heijden, 2012).  
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One such condition that is of particular interest is the role of governmental actors in VEPs. Many real 
world VEP examples indeed show some form of government involvement, or are even fully developed 
and implemented by governments (deLeon & Rivera, 2010; Ronit, 2012). Furthermore, some studies 
point out that it is government involvement in VEPs that may make the difference between good 
performance and poor performance (see various case studies in deLeon & Rivera, 2010; Morgenstern 
& Pizer, 2007; Ronit, 2012). Yet, despite increasing attention concerning the role of governments in 
VEPs, systematic analyses of such involvement are as yet lacking. To be able to assess whether 
governmental involvement in VEPs does indeed contribute to desired VEP outcomes, it is necessary, 
at the very least, to know why and how governments are involved in these innovative governance 
tools. From here on, future studies can then seek to understand the relationship between government 
involvement in VEPs and VEP outcomes. 
This then is the aim of this article. Informed by the current VEP literature, it systematically studies a 
stratified sample of 40 VEPs in the building sector in Australia, the Netherlands, Singapore and the 
United States, seeking to understand what ‘governmental involvement’ implies in real world VEPs. In 
doing so, this article contributes to a growing literature on VEPs, but it also adds to broader debates 
on the changing roles of the state in addressing environmental risks (Bell & Hindmoor, 2009; Giddens, 
2009; Holley, Gunningham, & Shearing, 2012; Wurzel et al., 2013). After all, the involvement of 
governments in VEPs goes against an oft made claim that the state has retreated in governing 
(Rhodes, 2007) and would fit better with claims that the role of the state has changed (or is changing) 
rather than that it has diminished (Braithwaite, 2008). 
The article is structured as follows. The next section brings together the existing literature on the roles 
of governmental actors in VEPs. The following section briefly discusses the research design and the 
approach to data analysis. The fourth section presents the research findings and a final section 
concludes. 
The roles of state actors in VEPs 
The role of governmental actors has been discussed to some extent in the VEP literature. Four 
questions drive this part of the literature: Why would governments wish to be involved in VEPs? Why 
would non-governmental actors wish to have governments involved in VEPs? What role(s) do 
governments take up in VEPs and, relatedly, how does governmental involvement affect VEP 
outcomes? 
Governments may seek to be involved in VEPs for various reasons. VEPs provide a vehicle for taking 
action in situations in which it is too costly or difficult to implement direct regulatory interventions, for 
instance due to a political unwillingness to do so (Darnall & Carmin, 2005). In such situations, VEPs 
may be used to test (future) policy interventions in an experimentalist manner, seeking to draw 
lessons on the impact of such (future) interventions (De Búrca & Scott, 2006). VEPs also provide an 
opportunity to showcase and market desired ‘beyond compliance’ behaviour, or a means of rewarding 
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leading firms (Saurwein, 2011). VEPs further open up the opportunity to collaborate closely with the 
regulated sector without forcing the latter to be involved in such collaborations (Hofman & De Bruijn, 
2010). 
Similarly, there are several reasons why non-governmental actors may seek government involvement 
in VEPs. Government involvement may provide legitimacy to VEPs in the eyes of the wider public 
(Solomon, 2008) and governments may be considered neutral actors by non-governmental 
participants, leading the latter to be more willing to become involved (Kickbusch, Hein, & 
Silberschmidt, 2010). Non-governmental actors may further seek to involve governments hoping to 
build close relationships which could help them to influence the direction of future policies (Barrett, 
1991). They may seek governmental involvement to reduce the costs of developing and implementing 
VEPs, to reduce information asymmetries between VEP participants and other stakeholders and to 
disseminate VEP results to a wide audience (Delmas & Terlaak, 2001; Lobel, 2004). Also, it is often 
considered that non-governmental actors become involved in VEPs seeking to prevent the 
implementation of future state-led legislation (Reid & Toffel, 2009). By involving governments in such 
VEPs, non-governmental actors could then highlight that they do indeed take action. 
Governments are found to take up a wide range of roles in VEPs. Some of these reflect somewhat 
traditional roles, whereas others reflect more novel ones. Broadly, the traditional roles discussed in 
the literature can be distinguished as ‘initiating and leading’ and ‘monitoring and enforcing’. The 
involvement of governments as initiators and leaders of VEPs is repeatedly considered necessary to 
help (potential) participants of VEPs find one another, to merge diverse interests and to ensure that a 
group of actors will, in collaboration, reach relevant and effective solutions (Davis, 2002). Scholars 
argue that without such leading and initiating, non-governmental actors may lack the cohesion and 
co-ordination needed to achieve their intended ends (Lobel, 2004).  
Scholars also point out that monitoring and enforcement is key to a VEP’s success (Lyon & Maxwell, 
2007; Short & Toffel, 2010). Without meaningful monitoring and enforcement, VEPs are not expected 
to achieve their intended outcomes (Bailey, 2008). Various forms of monitoring and enforcement are 
pointed out in the literature as having different impacts on VEP performance. For instance, self-
monitoring by participants is considered a weak form of monitoring and enforcement, whereas third 
party involvement is considered a strong form (Potoski & Prakash, 2009). Governments may be 
involved in VEPs as a third party to monitor and enforce the behaviour of VEP participants because of 
their experience with monitoring and enforcing traditional regulation (Bartle & Vass, 2007; DeMarzo, 
Fishman, & Hagerty, 2005).  
Of course some nuancing is necessary. There may be a very thin line between traditional state-led 
regulation and VEPs in which governments take up both initiating and leading roles, and monitoring 
and enforcing roles. There also remains the question of whether governments with often already 
limited monitoring and enforcement capacity will in fact be able to carry out this role successfully in 
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VEPs and whether they would indeed sanction non-compliance by VEP participants as this may scare 
off prospective VEP participants (Potoski & Prakash, 2009). 
The novel roles of governments in VEPs discussed in the literature can broadly be distinguished  as 
‘supporting’ (cf., Giddens, 2009) and ‘assembling’ (cf., Overdevest & Zeitlin, 2012). Governments may 
be in the right position to support VEPs, even when they do not take up any other role in VEPs. 
Support for VEPs from governments can come in various forms. They can support VEPs financially by 
providing monetary incentives, for instance through reduced environmental taxes for VEP participants 
(Croci, 2005). They can also provide administrative or in-kind support by providing staff or office 
space to non-governmental VEP administrators (Croci, 2005). Alternatively, they can (indirectly) 
support a VEP by threatening that future regulatory interventions will be put in place if a VEP turns out 
to be unsuccessful in addressing an environmental problem (Reid & Toffel, 2009). Finally, 
governments may support VEPs by requiring their suppliers of goods and services to participate in a 
particular VEP, or at least to provide them with goods and services that meet requirements 
comparable to those provided through a particular VEP (Hofman & De Bruijn, 2010). 
With ongoing growth in the number of VEPs, governments are sometimes thought to be best 
positioned to maintain an overview of these and to ensure their cohesion and capacity to address 
societal problems (Davis, 2002). They are also considered necessary to prevent VEPs coming into 
conflict with existing laws and regulations, or with the broader public interest (cf., Gunningham, 2009). 
More importantly, by keeping a birds-eye view on VEPs, governments may be able to see possible 
synergies between various VEPs, between VEPs and statutory regulation, or between participants in 
VEPs, and may try to ensure that such synergies actually materialise (Van der Heijden, 2013). This 
role is broadly captured as ‘assembling’ in this article (cf., Overdevest & Zeitlin, 2012). 
In what follows, the various roles of governments in VEPs are explored further. 
Research design: VEPs in the building sector 
In order to understand how the roles of governments in VEPs play out in real world settings, a 
comparative qualitative analysis was carried out with a series of 40 VEPs (cases) that all seek 
improved environmental performance in the building sector in Australia (13 cases), the Netherlands 
(8), Singapore (4) and the United States (15). The buildings sector here is defined as the construction, 
maintenance and use of buildings. All the VEPs studied seek to reduce carbon emissions in this 
sector, predominantly by seeking reduced energy consumption. 
The building sector is a relevant area to consider and is also key in addressing complex 
environmental problems, including climate change (IPCC, 2014). The sector accounts for 
approximately 35 per cent of global carbon emissions, but technology is already in place to make 
cost-effective reductions of up to 50 per cent (Newman, Beatley, & Boyer, 2009). This makes the 
building sector one of the few sectors in which considerable change in terms of reduced carbon 
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emissions is possible in the short term (IPCC, 2014). The sector is also the context for a wide variety 
and a large number of VEPs in which state actors take up a variety of roles, yet VEPs in this sector 
have only recently begun to attract scholarly attention (Hoffmann, 2011; Van der Heijden, 2014) and 
are much less studied than VEPs in areas such as forestry (Cashore et al., 2004) or fishery 
(Gullbrandsen, 2010).  
The countries were selected to include some variety in contextual settings in this study, aiming to gain 
insight into whether country context explains (variety in) governmental involvement in VEPs. Country 
choice for the current study was theory driven, but partly limited by practical constraints (time and 
money). The Netherlands represents a context of a country with a history of progressive 
environmental legislation, and a long history of experimenting with alternative policy instruments 
(Wurzel, et al., 2013). The United States also represents a context of a country with a long history of 
VEPs, including in the building sector (Morgenstern & Pizer, 2007). Australia represents a context of a 
country in which the adaptation of VEPs is relatively young, especially compared to the Netherlands 
and the United States (Beatley, 2009). Singapore, finally, was chosen as it is a country that has 
begun to explore VEPs, but provides a somewhat different institutional setting than the three other 
countries – i.e. state-guided economic development (Huff, 1995). 
3.1 Research approach and methodology 
Cases were identified based on an extensive Internet search using key words such as ‘sustainable 
development AND [country]’, ‘sustainable building AND [country]’ and ‘green construction AND 
[country]’. All 40 cases selected explicitly address the environmental and resource sustainability of 
buildings and their users. Furthermore, all the programs had been in operation for more than two 
years at the time of study. It was expected that the VEPs would need some time to achieve outcomes. 
Whilst case performance as well as the role(s) of governments in the cases may have changed over 
time, this was not included in the selection of cases. In interviews (see below) changes over time 
were addressed. 
Having selected the 40 cases, they were clustered (for heuristic purposes) according to their design, 
which resulted in five dominant types of VEP design within the study. Table 1 gives a brief overview of 
the specific types of VEPs studied, as well as an example of each type. It is necessary to point out 
that this is a broad brush typology, which inevitably does injustice to the wide variety of VEPs studied. 
The types are: partnerships between government and non-governmental actors, certification 
schemes, competitive grants, novel forms of contracting, and a suite of VEPs that seek to overcome 
financial or legal barriers. 
 
TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
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In order to understand the development and implementation process of the VEPs, in particular the 
role of governments, a series of in-depth face-to-face interviews were carried out. Interviewees were 
selected for their expert knowledge of and experience with one or more of the VEPs studied. A total of 
138 interviewees (53 in Australia, 27 in the Netherlands, 28 in Singapore and 18 in the United States) 
from various backgrounds participated in this study, representing the dominant roles and positions of 
actors in the building sector, i.e. policy makers, administrators, investors, developers, architects, 
engineers and property owners. These interviewees fulfilled (or had fulfilled) key roles in the VEPs 
studied, for instance as initiator, administrator or participant, or were considered by their peers as 
expert on one or more of the VEPs studied. 
The interviews were based on a semi-structured questionnaire which provided a structure of checks 
and balances to assess the validity of the data. Throughout the interviews, specific topics, particularly 
the role of governments in the VEPs, recurred by posing differently worded questions. Also, insights 
shared by interviewees were validated in other interviews with other participants. The interviews were 
recorded and transcribed in a report that was sent back to the interviewees for validation. The 
interviewees were often aware of and involved in more than one case. It is expected that this (partly) 
helped to overcome a sampling bias of administrators (and participants) who were overly enthusiastic 
about their ‘own’ VEP. Table 2 provides a brief overview of the interviewees. 
 
TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
 
A document study of existing information on the 40 cases and existing research on VEPs was carried 
out to cross-check the validity of the interview data and to supplement these with additional insights.  
The data were processed by means of a systematic coding scheme and qualitative data analysis 
software (Atlas.ti). By using this approach, the data were systematically explored and insights were 
gained into the ‘repetitiveness’ and ‘rarity’ of experiences shared by the interviewees, as well as those 
reported in the existing information also studied. This allowed in-depth understanding of the individual 
cases and it further assisted in tracing across-case patterns in the data. 
This is a qualitative study building on a stratified sample of 40 cases in a stratified sample of four 
countries. It is expected that the large number of cases and the variety of countries opens up a 
sufficient window to help gain a better understanding of the role of governmental actors in VEPs, but it 
is not claimed that the sample is (statistically) representative for all the VEPs and countries in the 
world (cf.,Hoffmann, 2011). 
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The role(s) of state actors in the 40 VEPs 
Table 3 gives an overview of how governments are involved in the 40 VEPs analysed. The table 
indicates that in almost all VEPs, governments take up at least one role (38 out of 40 cases; 95 per 
cent), and that in a large majority of the cases governments take up at least two roles (29 cases; 73 
per cent).  
 
TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE 
 
It logically follows that with the four roles identified in the second section of this paper, a total of 16 
possible combinations of roles for state actors in VEPs exist (2^4=16). That is, any combination of 
governments taking up none of these roles to taking up all of these roles. However, only seven of 
these combinations were identified. Table 4 gives an overview of the all combinations identified. 
 
TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE 
 
Tables 3 and 4 highlight that governments are not only very much involved in the 40 VEPs studied, 
but also that in the majority of cases they take up traditional roles combined with innovative roles (29 
cases; 73 per cent); only in a minority of cases do they take up no role at all (2 cases; 5 per cent), or 
only innovative roles (9 cases; 23 per cent) – for all these cases, this is a ‘supporting’ role. Table 4 
further indicates that two clusters of governmental involvement in VEPs represent the large majority of 
cases studied (27 cases; 68 per cent): VEPs in which governments only take up supporting roles (9 
cases; 23 per cent) and VEPs in which governments take up all roles (18 cases; 45 per cent). 
Yet, whilst of interest for indicating some patterns in the data, these numbers do not explain why 
governments are involved in the VEPs studied, or how their involvement is experienced by actors in 
the building sector. In what follows, therefore qualitative insights on the various roles of governments 
in these 40 VEPs are discussed.  
4.1 Initiating and leading 
Governments are involved in initiating and leading roles in 29 of the VEPs studied (73 per cent). 
When looking closely at the data, some country-specific findings come to the fore. In Australia, the 
Netherlands and the United States, the development of VEPs was considered a quick route for state 
actors to realize certain policy ideas. For instance, in the Netherlands, normally known for its 
progressive and ambitious environmental legislation (Jordan, 2003), interviewees referred to the slow 
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process of environmental policy making and implementation related to the design, construction and 
use of buildings. They explained that although the Dutch national building regulations are relatively 
well organized to ensure that buildings are healthy and safe, their environmental ambitions are very 
low. Interviewees considered it striking that it took more than 20 years to get a first set of building 
regulations implemented in the National Building Decree’s chapter on ‘Environment’ (also, Van 
Bueren & Priemus, 2002). Similar concerns are expressed about Australian and United States 
building regulations (Bond, 2011; Burby, 2006). In comparison, many of the VEPs studied took less 
than two years to develop and implement.  
In addition, as the interviewees explained, the advantage of having governments involved in leading 
roles in VEPs may be that it ensures some continuity, particularly in times of financial or political 
stress. The global financial crisis (GFC) was repeatedly mentioned as having affected the willingness 
of actors in the building sector to improve their environmental performance. It was also considered to 
have affected the performance of some VEPs without governments in leading roles. An administrator 
of a United States based VEP that builds on an innovative form of financing (case #42) reflects: 
...there was a wide range of [VEPs] to reduce greenhouse gas emissions in the 
building sector, but then the GFC hit. ... [Because we had ongoing] Federal funding, 
we could redirect the people from new construction [which was the focus of many 
VEPs] to retrofitting. All those things together made up for a perfect storm [referring to 
much interest in case #42 by developers]. (int. 179) 1 
In Singapore, the leading role of governmental actors in VEPs fits the country’s ideology of state-
guided economic development. This ideology considers a governance framework in which the state 
sets goals and incentivises the private sector to fulfil these (Huff, 1995). By taking the lead in the 
development of less coercive governance tools, the state can maintain a rather dominant role whilst 
allowing non-governmental actors to be involved in policy making and implementation. In addition, as 
interviewees explained, Singapore seeks to become the leader in the ASEAN region in terms of 
energy efficiency. In doing so, it needs to open up to international investors and businesses, which 
may ‘feel uncomfortable with a too strong command and control approach to policy making’ (int. 118; 
see also, Prakash & Potoski, 2006). For state actors in Singapore, VEPs may then provide a means 
of opening up existing policies, at the same time maintaining a dominant role.  
4.2 Monitoring and enforcing 
Governments are involved in monitoring and enforcing roles in 28 of the VEPs studied (70 per cent) – 
these were largely the same cases in which they played an initiating or leading role. Again, some 
country differences are worth discussing. In Australia, the Netherlands and the United states, 
interviewees considered governments in monitoring and enforcing roles as necessary to ensure a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 In line with the custom of qualitative social science research, interviewees provided me with their insights in 
confidence. As such, I cannot provide the identities of my interviewees (nor those of the VEPs studied – but see 
note 4) unless they have given me explicit approval to do so. To give the reader insight into the range of the 
interviews to which I give voice in this article, I refer to them with a number (e.g. ‘int. 50’).  
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VEP’s credibility. A typical insight from these countries comes from a senior consultant in the 
Netherlands, who has worked closely in both government-driven and non-government driven VEPs: 
The Dutch national government struggles with the credibility of [VEPs] as understood by the general 
public. A major and necessary role for the state is to strengthen this credibility by setting the right 
framework conditions and looking after their compliance. (int. 70)  
Yet, as the interviewees explained, in a government-driven VEP, the enforcement of requirements 
and the instigation of disciplinary action when violation is found may stand in the way of attracting 
participants. Either participants will pull out of the VEP when found to be in violation, or the VEP as a 
whole will become thought of as being too stringent, which may put off prospective participants from 
participating. Government-driven VEPs often rely on some state funding and are likely to be 
terminated if they do not provide timely results. Their administrators thus face a dilemma. They can 
choose to be somewhat softer to ensure significant participation, or to be very strict and run the risk 
that the VEP will be terminated due to a lack of participation or results: ‘You need to balance the need 
for accountability with commercial reality’, an administrator of an Australian VEP pointed out (int. 41). 
As she explained, participation may result in awareness of the goal the VEP aims to achieve at the 
participant level, which she expected to result in action over a longer time frame. Even if a participant 
did not fully live up to the goals of the VEP, she preferred participation over non-participation. This 
dilemma is an issue that recurs in the VEP literature (cf., Potoski & Prakash, 2009). 
The overall narrative in Singapore was again somewhat different. The VEPs studied there have 
largely been introduced to assist developers and property owners meet legislative requirements. The 
monitoring and enforcement role of government in these VEPs is in line with the approach to state-
guided economic development discussed earlier. For example, one of the cases studied, a 
certification scheme (case #28), is integrated in the statutory building regulatory framework. All new 
construction work needs to be certified at this certification scheme’s lowest level and all work is 
subject to normal building code enforcement practice. At first glance, this seems to conflict with the 
voluntary nature of the VEP, but as the administrators explained, participants may voluntarily seek 
higher levels of certification – through buildings that exceed the required levels of environmental 
performance. With all new construction work being exposed to this VEP, its administrators find that 
developers are willing to seek higher levels of compliance without additional compulsion. Up to 45 per 
cent of developers do so (int. 110). 
4.3 Supporting 
Governments have taken up supporting roles in 30 of the VEPs studied (80 per cent). Governmental 
actors generally provide funding or staffing for VEPs they have initiated or administered themselves, 
or act as (launching) customers for VEPs in which they have lesser or hardly any other roles. The 
former role is widely discussed in the extant literature, whereas the latter role has received less 
attention to date. 
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Interviewees in all countries consider governmental support to be of considerable importance to 
ensure that VEPs are successful in achieving meaningful outcomes in terms of buildings which are 
built or retrofitted with high levels of environmental performance. Governments are a dominant group 
of consumers of office space. By demanding office space with high levels of environmental 
performance, governments in the various countries not only show leadership or set an example, they 
can also add to the success of VEPs. One of the Dutch interviewees stated that: 
A major role for the state to play is that of launching customer. By requiring more sustainable products 
and services themselves, they hold the power to change the market. This is a role that non-state 
actors cannot take up, simply because they lack the volume. (int. 70) 
In all the countries in the sample, governmental actors at different levels of government now demand 
a certain benchmark rating of a VEP when acquiring or leasing new office space. A policymaker in a 
major Australian city explained: ‘When [case #1, a certification scheme] was introduced, we had no 
idea how quickly it would be taken up, especially in the early days. By demanding [case #1] for our 
buildings, we helped to launch [case #1]’ (int. 8). Accounts by administrators of these voluntary 
certification schemes (i.e. case #1, case #27 and case #55) in the various countries supported this 
role for governments in making this particular type of VEP a success.  
However, not only positive insights were shared. The same policymaker in Australia referred to a 
problem that governments face when mandating a VEP that is largely developed without 
governmental involvement: ‘Using [case #1] as legislation was difficult to do. It undoes the voluntary 
nature of [case #1] and it raises questions about the stringency of [case #1]’ (int. 8). Mandating a 
VEP, he continued, also implies that one program is chosen over another. In this example, the 
Australian city could just as well have chosen case #2 (another voluntary certification scheme), or 
even an internationally accepted voluntary certification scheme, such as case #55, developed in the 
United States. The choice of one VEP over another means that the participants of the selected VEP 
stand to gain; in contrast, participants from the other VEP are excluded from certain contracts with 
governmental actors. As this and other interviewees explained, such choices can produce difficulties 
in terms of equity – along with potential accountability failures when governmental actors may gain 
personally from choosing one VEP over another. 
4.4 Assembling 
Governments have taken up assembling roles in 21 of the VEPs studied (53 per cent). To illustrate 
this role, an example from the Australian cases is telling. A major Australian city has long been a very 
active proponent of VEPs in the building sector. Among others, it initiated case #6, which helps 
building owners to find funds for building retrofits, as banks are normally unwilling to provide funds for 
this purpose (cf., Managan, Layke, Monica, & Nesler, 2012). In this VEP, the city government 
collaborates with a number of finance providers, as well as with its major commercial property 
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owners. Through the VEP, these commercial property owners now have access to funds for building 
upgrades.  
At the same time, another national Australian VEP, case #3, addresses another part of the 
commercial building sector. This VEP considers that the way (office) tenants use their buildings is 
likely to be as important as the environmental credentials of the buildings. After all, if a highly energy 
efficient building is used inefficiently by its tenants, it will not achieve much in terms of energy savings. 
Equally, a prudent tenant might be able to reduce its energy consumption even if it does not occupy a 
top-class energy efficient building (cf., Pivo, 2010). 
Yet, for some years these two VEPs were disjoined and operated outside each other’s field of 
influence. Recently, an agency dedicated to urban sustainability within this city started to bring the 
participants and administrators of both VEPs together. As one staff member of this agency explained: 
‘We try to connect the two, [the landlord, participating in case #6, and the tenant, participating in case 
#3], so that they can inform each other on how to move forward’ (int. 26). The interviewees 
considered that these two VEPs achieve more together than individually because the property owners 
now collaborate with their tenants in seeking solutions to problems they face. One of the issues 
uncovered, for example, is that property owners often find it difficult to reflect the costs of a retrofit in 
the tenancy, or to ask its tenants to ensure that a retrofitted building is used in a particular way so that 
it will achieve its energy goals. The agency is now trialling a new form of ‘green’ leases in which 
landlord and tenants come to agreement on such issues.  
Similar agencies exist in other Australian cities as well as in cities in the United States. In a 
comparable case in the United States (case #46), an administrator even considered such assembling 
of VEPs by governments ‘one of the secret weapons’ because ‘it cuts a lot of red tape’ (int. 185) for 
participants who – in an assembling situation – do not have to fill out similar forms, apply for 
comparable funding and so on, when they wish to be involved in different VEPs.  
In the Netherlands and Singapore, such agencies are in place at the national level. It is likely that the 
sheer size of Australia and the United States and their relatively low density (especially compared to 
Singapore and the Netherlands) mean that these roles come naturally to city governments and not to 
national agencies. Experiences shared by these agencies in relation to their assembling role were 
comparable to the Australian example as, for instance, a member of staff of the national agency in the 
Netherlands explained: 
An organisation like ours is able to influence the market significantly. Even without financial 
incentives, there is much to be achieved by connecting people and organisations. (int. 79)  
That said, interview accounts also point to the fact that in Australia, the Netherlands and the United 
States, governments could take up even stronger assembling roles. As one of the interviewees, a 
United States building sector representative, explained:  
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My overall insight, after having been in the industry for many years now, is that the sustainable 
building movement is very fragmented. Everyone moves in the same direction, but hardly anyone is 
working together. Some do, but most are in their own little tower. A future of things would be to seek 
more synergy between the [VEPs]. (int. 183)  
This interviewee considered governments as being well positioned to generate such synergy. Also, 
now that the number of VEPs is growing, it may become unclear to prospective participants which 
VEP they should choose to participate in. Again the interviewees considered governmental actors as 
being in the right position to ensure coherence: 
There’s much uncertainty in the industry [in the Netherlands]. There are so many certificates and 
[other VEPs] around. People have a hard time understanding what is required in terms of 
sustainability. The government may take up a role of streamlining all this. We don’t need more 
fragmentation. (int. 78) 
5 Discussion and Conclusion 
This article has sought to understand to a greater extent why and how governmental actors are 
involved in VEPs and what this implies in real world settings. As indicated in the introduction, these 
are important questions to ask given that it is assumed that governmental involvement in VEPs affects 
their performance (see various case studies in deLeon & Rivera, 2010; Morgenstern & Pizer, 2007; 
Ronit, 2012). Whilst it was beyond the scope of this study to explore the efficacy hypothesis, it has 
sought to carry out some of the groundwork needed for future studies that do address that hypothesis. 
As with any research, this study comes with a number of caveats. The research approach – a 
qualitative comparative analysis of a stratified sample of 40 cases from four countries – inevitably 
results in limitations in terms of the reach of the conclusions drawn, as explained previously. That 
said, the study provides a number of insights that may advance our thinking about VEPs and the role 
of the state in (environmental) governing more generally. 
First, whilst the current literature on the role of the state in contemporary governing sometimes refers 
to a retreat of the state in governing (Rhodes, 2007), this study does not support that claim. In a 
stratified sample of 40 VEPs in the building sector in Australia, the Netherlands, Singapore and the 
United States, governmental actors are found to be involved in the large majority (95 per cent). Whilst 
the sample to some extent supports statements that the role of the state has shifted rather than 
diminished (Braithwaite, 2008), it does not show a sweeping shift in the role that governments have 
taken up in these VEPs. In the majority of the 40 VEPs studied, governments have taken up 
traditional roles (73 per cent), often in combination with novel roles; only in a small number of cases 
have governments taken up novel roles only (23 per cent). It seems more likely that – at least in the 
40 VEPs studied here – governments have embraced these innovative governance tools, but use 
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them in a rather traditional manner (through initiating, leading, monitoring and enforcing these VEPs) 
to achieve public goals (cf., Chhotray & Stoker, 2010). 
Second, what has further become clear is that ‘state actor involvement in VEPs’ can mean a variety of 
things. Here, four specific roles for state actors were uncovered in the current literature, and further 
explored through the qualitative study: initiating and leading, monitoring and enforcing, supporting, 
and assembling. These four different roles (and more can most probably be uncovered) may help 
future research to gain a better understanding of VEP performance. For instance, future studies may 
not only be interested in whether VEPs with governmental involvement are more effective than VEPs 
without governmental involvement, which is  a topic of debate in contemporary VEP studies (deLeon 
& Rivera, 2010; Morgenstern & Pizer, 2007), but may also wish to explore whether any or more of the 
distinct roles for governments in VEPs are related to desired VEP performance. In connection with 
this, future studies may further explore whether any particular combination of roles for governments in 
VEPs is more likely to result in desired VEP outcomes than other combinations.  
Third, in this study it is of interest that out of 16 possible clusters of role combinations, only seven 
clusters were uncovered, with two clusters being dominant. In addition, the seven clusters highlight 
that governments are very conservative in how they wish to be involved in the 40 cases studied. They 
predominantly take up traditional roles and combine these with novel roles. This indicates that 
governments may very well leave opportunities unexplored in terms of how they can be involved in 
VEPs. For instance, in none of the VEPs studied have governments taken up a sole assembling role, 
whereas this particular role was highly appreciated by the VEP participants and administrators 
interviewed. An assembling role appears relatively undemanding for governments in terms of funds or 
staff required, but it may yield considerable results (although this assumption needs further testing). 
Assembling also appears to be a role that governments can take up over the lifecycle of one or more 
VEPs and may help to boost VEPs that perform poorly. Another interesting insight that has come to 
the fore are experienced complications with the supporting role. Particularly when governments are in 
a position to favour one VEP over another tensions may rise as the example of mandating a VEP in 
Australia (case #1) indicated. Scholars may wish to further explore, in particular, such assembling and 
supporting roles and the opportunities and tensions that may come with these.  
To conclude, government involvement in VEPs is not blunt intervention and does not go against the 
voluntary nature of VEPs. It can be subtly tailored to the need of a VEP and its specific context, as 
many of the insights from the interviews highlight. It is now time to explore in greater depth whether 
the roles of government do indeed improve the performance of VEPs.  
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Table 1 - Types of VEPs studied. 
Type Description No. 
Partnerships  In these VEPs, governments have entered into partnerships with non-state 
actors or signed covenants that seek to improve the environmental performance 
of the latter. The Better City Partnership (fictional name,2 case #9 in this article) 
is a partnership between the city government of a major Australian City and the 
major commercial property owners in that city. The Partnership seeks to 
significantly reduce the carbon emissions of the commercial property of the 
property owners. Through the Partnership these organisations seek to overcome 
existing barriers property owners (often as landlords) face in improving the 
sustainability performance of their buildings, and to achieve substantial 
improvements of the environmental performance of their buildings. The City 
supports the property owners in achieving this aim. 
10 
Certification 
schemes 
These VEPs build a set of criteria that a building, building product, individual or 
organization has to meet in order to get a certain rating. A typical example is the 
United States’ Green Building Certificate (fictional name, case #53). This VEP 
consists of a set of sustainability criteria for buildings. Building designs and 
construction work are assessed against these criteria and the more criteria met, 
the better the rating (e.g. a 6 star rated building highlights that it outperforms a 3 
star rated structure. 
7 
Competitive 
grants 
These VEPs have been introduced to help property owners and developers 
improve the environmental performance of their buildings. This type of financial 
support awards projects that are expected to achieve the best results in terms of 
environmental performance within a pool of projects seeking this financial 
support. The Positive Energy Home Competition in one of the major cities of the 
United States (fictional name, case #52) challenges architects, engineers and 
developers to design a house that produces more renewable energy than the 
energy it consumes. The teams with the most promising designs are awarded a 
prime building location in the city to realise the design. 
5 
Novel forms 
of 
contracting 
Typical examples of VEPs that build on novel forms of contracting in all the 
countries included in the study are Energy Service Companies, or ESCOs. 
ESCOs manage energy consumption and energy provision for building owners. 
They usually install energy producing and energy reducing technology, such as 
4 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 I have promised the interviewees anonymity and agreed to refer to the various real world cases studied in this 
article using fictional names (but see note 3). 
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solar panels and low energy lighting. The ESCO pays for the investment and is 
rewarded with the monetary value of the energy savings achieved. Governments 
often seek to support ESCOs by changing legislation, or by developing ESCO 
contracts. 
Overcoming 
financial or 
legal barriers 
The remaining VEPs all seek to reduce legal or financial barriers that hamper 
increased environmental performance of buildings in other ways. For instance, a 
major Dutch city is experimenting with a Revolving Sustainable Investment Fund 
(fictional name, case #24). This fund provides low interest loans to property 
developers and property owners who wish to develop sustainable buildings with 
higher levels of environmental performance than Dutch building regulations 
require, but who cannot get mortgages for doing so. Once the loans are paid 
back by developers and property owners, the fund will supply loans to others. 
The costs of administrating the fund are paid for by the low interest on the loans 
supplied. There is a potential major win for the city council, which has also made 
an international pledge to reduce this city’s carbon emissions significantly. If the 
fund proves to be successful, it can also be implemented in other Dutch cities. 
An example of a VEP that seeks to overcome legal barriers is Green Gate 
(fictional name, case #33) in a major Australian city. This VEP seeks to fast track 
development proposals that meet high levels of urban sustainability, but that also 
face legal barriers as they propose solutions that are not yet accepted under 
current building codes (e.g. particular solutions for collecting and using 
rainwater). 
14 
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Table 2 - Interviewees’ background 
 
Interviewee background Government Non-government 
Policy maker 14 (4A/4N/6S/1U)*  
Administrator 41 (22A/4N/12S/3U) 30 (12A/3N/3S/12U) 
Architect, engineer, 
advisor 
 14 (5A/6N/3S) 
Contractor, developer  12 (3A/4N/5S) 
Property owner  9 (4A/3N/2S) 
Other 3 (3S) 15 (3A/3N/7S/2U) 
Total 58 (26A/8N/21S/4U)  80 (27A/19N/20S/14U) 
*Abbreviations: A=Australia; N=Netherlands; S=Singapore; U=United States 
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Table 3  - Summary of data3 
 
Case type and number  Role of government in VEPs 
  Initiating/ 
Leading 
Monitoring/ 
Enforcing 
Supporting Assembling 
Australia      
Certification scheme 1 absent absent present absent 
Certification scheme 2 present present present absent 
Partnership 3 present present present present 
Barrier relief 4 absent absent present absent 
Barrier relief 6 present present present present 
Partnership 9 present present present present 
Certification scheme 11 absent absent absent absent 
Competitive grant 12 present present present present 
Barrier relief 14 present present present present 
Barrier relief 15 present present present present 
Competitive grant 17 present present present present 
Partnership 18 present present absent absent 
Barrier relief 33 present present absent present 
 
Netherlands 
     
Novel contracting 19 present present absent absent 
Partnership 20 present present present present 
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Barrier relief 21 absent absent present absent 
Novel contracting 23 absent absent present absent 
Barrier relief 24 present present present absent 
Partnership 25 present present present absent 
Partnership 26 present present present present 
Certification scheme 27 absent absent present absent 
 
Singapore 
     
Certification scheme 28 present present present absent 
Partnership 29 absent absent present absent 
Competitive grant 31 present present present present 
Novel contracting 32 present present present present 
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Table 3-  continued 
Case type and number  Role of government in VEPs 
  Initiating/ 
Leading 
Monitoring/ 
Enforcing 
Supporting Assembling 
 
United States 
     
Competitive grant 13 present present present present 
Partnership 22 present present absent absent 
Barrier relief 42 present present present absent 
Novel contracting 43 absent absent absent absent 
Partnership 45 present present present present 
Barrier relief 46 present absent absent present 
Partnership 47 present present present present 
Barrier relief 48 present present present present 
Barrier relief 49 present present present present 
Barrier relief 50 absent absent present absent 
Barrier relief 51 present present absent present 
Competitive grant 52 present present present present 
Certification scheme 53 absent absent present absent 
Barrier relief 54 present present present present 
Certification scheme 55 absent absent present absent 
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Table 4 – Clusters of government involvement in VEPs 
Role(s) Country:* A N S U Total 
None 1   1 2 
Supporting only 2 3 1 3 9 
Leading/initiating + Monitoring/Enforcing 1 1  1 3 
Leading/initiating + Facilitating    1 1 
Leading/initiating + Monitoring/Enforcing + Facilitating 1   1 2 
Leading/initiating + Monitoring/Enforcing + Supporting 1 2 1 1 5 
Leading/initiating + Monitoring/Enforcing + Supporting + Facilitating 7 2 2 7 18 
Total 13 8 4 15 40 
*Abbreviations: A=Australia; N=Netherlands; S=Singapore; U=United States 
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